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Abstract
In Bitcoin system, transactions are prioritized according to transaction fees.
Transactions without fees are given low priority and likely to wait for confirma-
tion. Because the demand of micro payment in Bitcoin is expected to increase
due to low remittance cost, it is important to quantitatively investigate how
transactions with small fees of Bitcoin affect the transaction-confirmation time.
In this paper, we analyze the transaction-confirmation time by queueing theory.
We model the transaction-confirmation process of Bitcoin as a priority queue-
ing system with batch service, deriving the mean transaction-confirmation time.
Numerical examples show how the demand of transactions with low fees affects
the transaction-confirmation time. We also consider the effect of the maximum
block size on the transaction-confirmation time.
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1. Introduction
Bitcoin is a digital currency system that was invented by Satoshi Nakamoto
in 2008 [14]. Unlike the existing online payment systems such as credit cards and
debit ones, a remarkable feature of Bitcoin system is its decentralized nature.
Bitcoin does not have a central authority to manage Bitcoin transactions. All
the Bitcoin transactions are registered in the ledger called blockchain, and the
blockchain is maintained by a volunteer-based peer-to-peer (P2P) network. Vol-
unteer nodes joining the P2P network hold the same replica of the blockchain,
which enables everyone to check consistency of transactions.
From information-technology point of view, Bitcoin is fast, secure, and has
lower fees than the existing payment schemes. These features make Bitcoin
advantageous for both consumers and retailers. Due to low fees for processing
transactions, Bitcoin is expected to accelerate the use of micro payment such as
buying daily items and small amount remittance.
Every transaction needs to be stored into a block that a volunteer node,
called miner, creates, and the block needs to be appended to the tail of the
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blockchain when a miner succeeds in creating the block. An average time interval
of block creation is adjusted to be about 10 minutes. Only transactions in blocks
included in the blockchain are admitted as valid ones, which are called confirmed
transactions. It is said that to avoid double-spending, if the user receives the
coin in a transaction, he/she should wait to use it until the block including the
transaction and some subsequent blocks are created [24].
When a sender creates a transaction, he/she can make the transaction in-
clude a fee, which can be received by the miner who creates a block that stores
the transaction. There is no incentive for miners to store transactions without
fee into the block they are creating. Since the Bitcoin system restricts the num-
ber of transactions which a block can hold, miners may put a higher priority on
transactions with a larger fee. Therefore, the transaction-confirmation time of
transactions with a small fee tend to be much larger than those of ones with a
large fee.
Note that in micro-payment case, the fee amount of micro-payment transac-
tions is likely to be small due to its small amount remittance. If the use of micro
payment becomes popular in the future, the confirmation time of transactions
with small fees will be too long for users to make micro payment.
In this paper, we consider how the growth of micro payment affects the
confirmation process of small amount transactions. We collect statistics from
the blockchain, investigating the transaction-confirmation time. Then we model
the transaction-confirmation process of Bitcoin as a queueing system with bulk
service and priority mechanism, deriving the mean transaction-confirmation
time for each-priority transaction. In numerical examples, we show how the
transaction-confirmation time is affected with the increase in demand of micro
payment.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We briefly review the related
work in Section 2. Section 3 shows a summary of Bitcoin system, mainly fo-
cusing on the blockchain construction and the impact of transaction fee on the
transaction-confirmation process. Section 4 shows some statistics about Bitcoin,
some of which are used in the later experiments. In Section 5, we describe the
queueing model for the confirmation process of Bitcoin system, and the analy-
sis of the queueing model is presented. In Section 6, we show some numerical
examples, discussing the effect of the demand of transactions with low fee on
the confirmation time of transactions. Concluding remarks are given in Section
7.
2. Related Work
Recently, Bitcoin has attracted considerable attention, and been widely stud-
ied in various research communities. For example, the economic community
studies Bitcoin system from the virtual-currency point of view. The aspects
of applications of encryption and P2P networking are of interest in computer
science [8]. The community of social science focuses on the incentive mechanism
of Bitcoin ecosystem. Comprehensive reviews in terms of technology principles,
history, risks and regulatory issues are well provided in [4, 19, 5]. Almost all
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papers on Bitcoin are introduced in [23]. Here, we present only papers close to
our research.
One of important issues in Bitcoin is transaction fee. It is expected that
transaction fees become incentives for miners to provide much computation
power in order to verify transactions. The authors of [13] investigate the trends
of transaction fees by analyzing 55.5 million transaction records, revealing the
regime shift of Bitcoin transaction fees. It is shown that transactions with non-
zero fee are likely to be processed faster than those with zero fee, and that
the amount of fee doesn’t affect the transaction latency significantly. In terms
of the latter claim, however, their statistical analysis shows the tendency that
transactions with small fee are likely to wait longer than those with large fee.
Another important issue is the maximum block size. Currently, the maxi-
mum block size is limited to 1 Mbyte due to a security reason of spam attack
[15]. It is reported in [25] that Bitcoin handles at most seven transactions per
second (tps) due to the maximum block size of 1 Mbyte. In order for Bitcoin
to scale to tens of thousands of tps, which is equivalent to the processing speed
of credit card transactions, enlarging the maximum block size is considered.
There exist many discussions about the effect of the maximum block size on the
incentive of miners. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, however, there is
no work for quantitatively investigating the impact of the enlargement of the
maximum block size on the transaction-confirmation time.
Block confirmation time also affects the scalability of Bitcoin. Sompolinsky
and Zohar [16, 17] propose a modification to the blockchain, called GHOST, so
that block confirmation time becomes about 600 times shorter than the original
Bitcoin without loosing the security of Bitcoin. Kiayias and Panagiotakos [12]
show a formal security proof and the speed-security tradeoff of GHOST. A
security issue about shortening block confirmation time is double spending,
which is studied in [3, 10].
The block-construction process can be modeled as a queueing system with
batch service, in which a group of customers leave the system simultaneously at
service completion. There exist literature for the analysis of queues with batch
service. Chaudhry and Templeton consider an M/GB/1 queueing system with
batch service [6, 7]. In M/GB/1, customers arrive at the system according to a
Poisson process, the number of servers is one, and the service time distribution
follows a general distribution. If there exist customers in queue at a service
completion, the server accommodates customers as a batch, where the batch size
is limited to some constant. Using supplemental variable technique, the authors
derive the joint distribution of the remaining service time and the number of
customers in queue. In [6, 7], however, the priority mechanism is not taken into
consideration. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, priority queueing system
with batch service has not been fully studied yet. In this paper, we model the
transaction-confirmation process of Bitcoin as a queueing system in which both
priority mechanism and batch service are taken into consideration.
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3. Summary of Bitcoin System
In this section, we give a brief summary of Bitcoin system. The readers are
referred to [2] for details.
3.1. Transaction Confirmation Process
The Bitcoin system realizes virtual currency with two types of information
data: transactions and blocks. A transaction is the base of value transfer be-
tween payer and payee, while a block is a data unit for storing several confirmed
transactions.
When a payer makes payment to a payee in Bitcoin system, the payer issues a
transaction into the Bitcoin P2P network. The transaction contains the amount
of payment, the source account(s) of the payer, the destination account(s) of
the payee, and the fee that the payer pays to a miner (and the others). The
transaction is propagated through the P2P network, and temporally stored in
memory pool of volunteer nodes, called miners.
The role of miner nodes is to generate a block, which contains transactions
to be validated. Miners try to solve a mathematical problem based on a crypto-
graphic hash algorithm for block generation (referred to as proof-of-work [14]).
The miner who finds its solution first becomes a winner, and is awarded reward1,
which consists of some fixed value called coinbase and the fees of transactions
included in the block, and the right to add a new block to the blockchain. The
solution to the problem is included in the new block, and the miners try again to
solve a new mathematical problem for the next block. This competition process
is called mining. Embedding the solution for the current block to the next block
plays an important role for preventing from falsification of previous blocks. The
difficulty of problems in Bitcoin mining is automatically adjusted by the system
so that the time interval between consecutive block generations is 10 minutes
on average.
Since miners do not gain any profit from transactions without fee and the
total size of transactions that a block can store is limited to 1 Mbyte in the
Bitcoin system, some miners may ignore such transactions. Therefore, it is
considered that the transaction-confirmation time of transactions without fee is
much bigger than those of ones with fee.
In [13], the authors study trends of Bitcoin transaction fee conventions by
analyzing the transaction fees paid with 55.5 million transactions recorded in
the blockchain. They find that the confirmation time of transactions without
fee are longer than those with fee. It is also reported that difference between
transaction-confirmation times for different fees are not significant. In terms of
the latter claim, however, their statistical analysis reveals that transactions with
fee of 0.0005 are likely to wait longer than those with fee of 0.001. (See Table
1In 2017, the output of the coinbase for one-block mining is 12.5 bitcoin. The output value
of it is halved every 210,000 blocks. Since the mining time for one block is 10 minutes on
average, this corresponds to a four-year halving schedule.
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Table 1: Block-generation time.
Mean [s] 544.09
Variance 2.9277× 105
Maximum [s] 6,524
Minimum [s] 0
Median [s] 377
Table 2: Number of transactions in a block.
Mean [transactions] 529.27
Variance 2.5152× 105
Maximum [transactions] 12,239
Minimum [transactions] 0
Median [transactions] 386
2 in [13].) If the demand of transactions for micro payment increases in future,
those transactions may suffer from a very long confirmation time because payers
of micro payment are not willing to pay fee and the resulting priority of their
transactions is low.
4. Bitcoin Transaction Statistics
In this section, we show some statistics of Bitcoin blocks and transactions.
We collected data of blocks and transactions from blockchain.info [22]. We
chose the two-year mining period from October 2013 to September 2015.
4.1. Basic Statistics
Table 1 shows statistics of block-generation time. The statistics are calcu-
lated from 115,921 blocks in the measurement period. In this table, the mean
block-generation time is 544.09 s, approximately 9 minutes. This is smaller
than 10 minutes, the average time interval between consecutive block genera-
tions. This result, however, supports that Bitcoin mining is managed according
to the system protocol.
Table 2 shows the number of transactions in a block. Here, we count not only
transactions issued by users, but also coinbase transactions. The mean number
of transactions in a block is 529.27, and hence the mean rate of transaction
processing is 1.05 transaction/s.
Table 3 shows the statistics of the transaction size in byte. The mean trans-
action size for the two-year period is 571.34 bytes. Since the maximum block size
is 1 Mbyte, we can roughly approximate the maximum number of transactions
in a block equal to 1750.3.
In order to investigate the impact of transactions with small fee on the
transaction-confirmation time, we classify transactions into priority classes. Re-
mind that the confirmation time of transactions with a small fee are longer than
those with a large fee [13]. This implies that transactions without fee are given
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Table 3: Transaction size in byte.
Mean 571.34
Variance 3.7445× 106
Maximum 999657
Minimum 62
Median 259
Table 4: Cumulative frequency of fee amount for transactions.
BTC Frequency
0 1378501
0.00001 3050709
0.0001 42881857
0.001 60723356
0.01 61219997
0.1 61236481
1 61236972
10 61237045
the lowest priority for the block-inclusion process. Therefore, we classify trans-
actions into two types, high (H) and low (L), in terms of the amount of fee
added to a transaction. Transactions with fee greater than or equal to 0.0001
BTC2 are classified into H class, while those without fee smaller than 0.0001
BTC are prioritized as L class. We show the cumulative frequency of the fee
amount for transactions in Table 4.
Table 5 shows the statistics of transactions by type. Here, classless indicates
the statistics for all the transactions, and TCT is the transaction-confirmation
time. The mean arrival rate is the number of transactions per day. In this table,
the mean transaction-confirmation time for the overall transactions is 1,075.0 [s]
≈ 17.917 minutes, almost twice greater than the mean block-generation time.
In terms of priority-type statistics, the mean transaction-confirmation time
for L class is greater than that for H class, and its difference is 2,870.0 [s] ≈
47.833 minutes.
4.2. Fee-amount distribution and transaction-arrival rate
Figure 1 illustrates how the fee-amount distribution changes over time. The
fee-amount distribution is the ratio of the amount of H/L-transactions to that
of transactions issued in one day. Each region in Figure 1 shows the percentage
of transactions in two different classes.
In Figure 1, the percentage of each class fluctuates in a small range, except
that L-class has a spike from July 2015 to October 2015. It is reported in [22]
that the number of transactions per day exhibits a rapid increase during the
2In May 2017, 0.0001 BTC is about 0.12 USD.
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Table 5: Transaction-type statistics.
Statistic Classless H L
Number of transactions 61,353,014 57,058,947 4,294,067
Mean TCT [s] 1075.0 874.13 3744.1
Variance of TCT 1.8989× 108 8.4505× 107 1.5826× 109
Maximum of TCT 3.1045× 107 3.1045× 107 2.6244× 107
Minimum of TCT 0 0 0
Median of TCT 510 502 640
Mean arrival rate 0.97275 0.90466 0.068082
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Figure 1: Trend of fee-amount distribution over time.
same period. From these observations, we can claim that the percentages of H
and L classes remain almost the same even though the volume of transactions
increases rapidly.
Figure 2 represents the transaction-arrival rate of each class. The horizontal
axis is day, and its origin is October 1, 2013. We observe in this figure that the
transaction-arrival rate of each class gradually increases with fluctuation over
time. The exceptional spikes are observed in the range of 650 to 730, the same
period in Figure 1.
From these figures, we can expect that the transaction-arrival rate mono-
tonically grows, keeping the same percentage of fee-amount class.
5. Priority Queueing Analysis
This section describes our queueing model of Bitcoin transaction processing
and main results of transaction-confirmation time. The detailed derivations are
presented in Appendix A.
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Figure 2: Trend of transaction-arrival rates of two priority classes.
5.1. Mean Transaction-Confirmation Time
Let Si denote the ith block-generation time. In this paper, we regard a
block-generation time as a service time. We assume {Si}’s are independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) and have a distribution function G(x). Let g(x)
denote the probability density function of G(x). The mean block-generation
time E[S] is given by
E[S] =
∫ ∞
0
xdG(x) =
∫ ∞
0
xg(x)dx.
A transaction arrives at the system according to a Poisson process with
rate λ. Transactions arriving to the system are served in a batch manner. A
batch service starts when a transaction arrives at the system in idle state. The
consecutive transactions arriving at the system are served in a batch until the
number of batch size equals b. That is, newly arriving transactions are included
into the creating block as long as the resulting block size is smaller than the
maximum block size b. This assumption follows from the behavior of the default
Bitcoin client described in [2].
Let N(t) denote the number of transactions in system at time t, and X(t)
denote the elapsed service time at t. We define Pn(x, t) (n = 1, 2, . . . , x, t ≥ 0)
and P0(t) as
3
Pn(x, t)dx = Pr{N(t) = n, x < X(t) ≤ x+ dx},
P0(t) = Pr{N(t) = 0}.
3We follow the definition of Pn(x, t) in [6, 7]. Rigorously, we define Pn(x, t) as
Pn(x, t) =
d
dx
Pr{N(t) = n,X(t) ≤ x}
assuming it exists.
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Note that Pn(x, t)dx is the joint probability that at time t, there are n transac-
tions in system and the elapsed service time lies between x and x+ dx. We also
define limiting distributions Pn(x) = limt→∞ Pn(x, t) and P0 = limt→∞ P0(t).
Let ξ(x) denote the hazard rate of S, which is given by
ξ(x) =
g(x)
1−G(x) .
Let T denote the sojourn time of a transaction. In the context of Bitcoin, T
is the transaction-confirmation time, i.e., the time interval from the time epoch
at which a user issues a transaction to the point when the block including the
transaction is confirmed. Then, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 1. The mean transaction-confirmation time E[T ] is given by
E[T ] =
1
2λ2(b− λE[S])
(
b∑
k=1
αk
[
b(b− 1) + {(b+ 1)b− k(k − 1)}λE[S]
+(b− k)λ2E[S2]
]
− λ{b(b− 1)− λ2E[S2]}) , (1)
where
αk =
∫ ∞
0
Pk(x)ξ(x)dx.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
5.2. Transaction-Confirmation Time for Priority Queueing Model
In this subsection, we consider the system in which transactions are prior-
itized for the inclusion to a block, deriving the mean transaction-confirmation
time for each priority class.
We assume that transactions are classified into c priority classes. For 1 ≤
i, j ≤ c, i class transactions have priority over transactions of class j when i < j.
Let λi (i = 1, 2, . . . , c) denote the arrival rate of i-class transactions. We assume
that
∑c
i=1 λiE[S] < 1. We define Ti as the sojourn time of class i transactions.
For simplicity, we introduce the following notation
λi =
i∑
k=1
λk, i = 2, 3, . . . , c.
Assuming that the system is work conserving, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Let Ti (i = 1, . . . , c) denote the confirmation time of class i trans-
actions.
E[T1] = f(λ1),
E[Ti] =
1
λi
(
λif(λi)−
i−1∑
k=1
λkE[Tk]
)
, i = 2, 3, . . . , c,
where f(λ) = E[T ], given by (1).
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Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Remark: Strictly speaking, our priority queueing model is not work conserving.
(See Appendix A.2.) E[Ti]’s given in Theorem 2 are approximations which work
well for high utilization. When the block-generation time follows an exponential
distribution, however, E[Ti]’s in Theorem 2 agree with simulation results, as
shown in subsection 6.2.
In the following section of numerical examples, we consider two priority-
class case: high and low. Let λH and λL denote the arrival rate of high-priority
transactions and that of low-priority ones, respectively. Let also TH and TL
denote the sojourn time of high-priority transactions and that of low-priority
ones, respectively. In this two priority-class case, we obtain
E[TH ] = f(λH), (2)
E[TL] =
(
λH
λL
+ 1
)
f(λH + λL)− λH
λL
f(λH). (3)
6. Numerical Examples
In this section, we show some numerical examples obtained from the ana-
lytical results in previous section. First, we consider the distribution of block-
generation time with a simple mining model. Then, we show the transaction-
confirmation times of H- and L-class transactions, investigating how the transaction-
arrival rate and the block size affect the performance measure.
6.1. Distribution of block-generation time
In order to calculate the mean transaction-confirmation time, we need to
determineG(x), the distribution of the block-generation time. In [9], the authors
claim that the block-generation time is exponentially distributed. They consider
a hash calculation by a miner node as a Bernoulli trial, which is independent of
previous hash calculations. This yields that the number of experiments for the
first success is given by geometric distribution, and hence it can be approximated
by exponential distribution. In Appendix B, we show an alternative approach
to the block-generation time distribution with extreme value theory.
In subsection 4.1, we showed that the mean block-generation time is 544.09
[s]. That is, the mean block-generation rate is 1.8379× 10−3. In the following,
we assume that the block-generation time S follows the exponential distribution
given by
G(x) = 1− e−µx,
where µ = 1.8379× 10−3.
In Figure 3, we plot the relative frequency of the block-generation time ob-
tained from the measured data, and the probability density function of the above
exponential distribution. The horizontal axis represents the block-generation
time in second, and the vertical axis is the logarithmic scale of the frequency
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Figure 3: Relative frequency and exponential probability density function of block-generation
time.
values. This figure shows a good agreement between the measured data and
exponential distribution.
From the assumption of exponential distribution for the block-generation
time, we set E[S] and E[S2] as
E[S] =
1
µ
= 544.09, E[S2] =
2
µ2
= 5.9208× 105.
The Laplace-Stieltjes transform (LST) of G(x) is given by
G∗(s) =
µ
s+ µ
.
With the above setting, we calculate mean sojourn times of transactions in
previous section.
6.2. Verification and Comparison
6.2.1. Verification of analysis
In order to validate the analysis in section 5, we conducted discrete-event
simulation experiments. The simulation model is the same as the priority queue-
ing one described in section 5. We developed a simulation program with C++,
and generated 50 samples for one estimate of the transaction-confirmation time,
calculating the 95% confidence interval.
Figure 4 represents the analytical and simulation results of mean transaction-
confirmation times for H and L classes. Here, we set b = 1000, and the horizontal
axis is the overall arrival rate λ, given by λ = λH + λL. We increase λ, keeping
11
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Figure 4: Comparison of analysis and simulation for the transaction-confirmation time: Two-
priority case.
the ratio of λH to λL constant. More precisely, let ζ denote the ratio of λH to
λL. From Table 5, we set ζ as
ζ =
λH
λL
=
0.90466
0.068082
= 13.288.
By using ζ, λH and λL are described as
λH =
ζλ
1 + ζ
, λL =
λ
1 + ζ
.
With λH and λL, we calculate E[TH ] and E[TL] as the function of λ.
Figure 4 shows overall good agreement between the analysis and simulation
for both H and L classes. Remind that E[Ti]’s given in Theorem 2 (and hence
E[TH ] of (2) and E[TL] of (3)) are approximations. Figure 4 suggests that
our approximation analysis becomes exact when the block-generation time is
exponentially distributed.
In the following subsections, we show the numerical results calculated by (2)
and (3).
6.2.2. Comparison of analysis and measurement
Next, we compare analytical results of the transaction-confirmation time
with measurement ones of Table 5. Table 6 shows the results of measurement
and analysis for the transaction-confirmation time in three cases: classless, H
class and L class. We calculate the transaction-confirmation time for classless
case by (1), while we compute E[TH ] (resp. E[TL]) from (2) (resp. (3)). In the
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Table 6: Comparison of analysis and measurement for the transaction-confirmation time.
Transaction Type Arrival Rate Measurement Analysis
Classless 0.97275 1,075.0 568.10
H 0.90466 874.13 562.16
L 0.068082 3,744.1 647.05
analytical computation, we set b = 1750, which is an estimate obtained from
Table 2.
In Table 6, the measurement value for classless case is almost twice larger
than the corresponding analytical one. We also observe that discrepancies be-
tween measurement and analysis for H and L classes are large, and that the
discrepancy for L class is significantly larger than that for H class.
First, we consider the reason of the discrepancy for classless case. In the
previous subsection, we concluded that the block-generation time follows an
exponential distribution with mean 544.095 [s]. Note that the arrival rate of
classless case is 0.97275, and hence the system utilization ρ is
ρ = λE[S] = 0.97275× 544.095 = 529.27.
Since the maximum block size b is 1750, the system is not overloaded. In such a
situation of low utilization, a newly arriving transaction is likely to be included
in the block which is under the current mining process.
Remind that our analytical model follows the behavior of the default bitcoin
client for updating the blockchain described in [2], that is, miners include newly
arriving transactions into the creating block as long as the resulting block size is
smaller than the maximum block size. The above comparison result implicitly
means that a newly arriving transaction is not included in the block currently
processed, but is included to the block following the currently processed block.
This conjecture is supported by the fact that the block-generation time fol-
lows an exponential distribution. In the underloaded situation, the confirmation
time of a newly arriving transaction consists of the remaining generation time
of the block under mining and the generation time of the next block. Due
to the memoryless property of exponential distribution, the remaining block-
generation time also follows the same exponential distribution. This results in
that the transaction-confirmation time is almost twice larger than the block-
generation time.
Next, we consider the reason why the discrepancy between measurement
and analysis for L class is larger than that for H class. In our analytical model,
we assumed that L-class transactions in system are served as long as the block
being in service is not occupied by H-class transactions. The large discrepancy
between measurement and analysis for L class in Table 6 implies that L-class
transactions in Bitcoin system are less served than the assumed priority queueing
discipline. As we stated in introduction, there is little incentive for miners to
build a block with transactions with small fees. This result suggests that there
exist miners who intentionally exclude transactions with small fees from the
13
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Figure 5: Mean transaction-confirmation time: classless case.
block inclusion process.
According to the above discussion, we can conjecture that miner nodes don’t
follow the behavior of the default bitcoin client, and that there may exist miners
who never include transactions with small fees to a block.
6.3. Mean transaction-confirmation time: classless case
In this subsection, we show the mean transaction-confirmation time for class-
less case. Figure 5 represents the mean transaction-confirmation time E[T ]
against the overall transaction-arrival rate λ. Here, we plot E[T ]’s for b = 1000,
2000, 3000, 4000 and 5000. In this figure, E[T ] for each b increases from 544
s, the mean block-generation time, and grows to infinity as λ approaches b/µ
(= bE[S]).
Note that the case of b = 2000 approximately illustrates the transaction-
confirmation time under the block-size limit of 1 Mbyte. The transaction-
confirmation time rapidly increases when λ becomes greater than 3. Roughly
speaking, the transaction-confirmation time becomes intolerable when the num-
ber of transactions issued in one second is greater than three. This is just the
reason why the maximum block-size limit is an important issue for the scalability
of Bitcoin.
Note also that b = 3000, 4000 and 5000 can be regarded as cases of the
maximum block size equal to 1.5 Mbytes, 2 Mbytes and 2.5Mbytes, respec-
tively. We can see that enlarging the maximum block size is effective to make
the transaction-confirmation time small. Even when b = 5000, however, the
transaction-confirmation time becomes worse around λ = 8. This result sug-
gests that enlarging the maximum block size is not effective for the scalability
14
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Figure 6: Mean transaction-confirmation time: two-priority case. (λH = 0.90466)
of Bitcoin.
6.4. Mean transaction-confirmation time: two-priority case
In this subsection, we investigate how the priority mechanism in Bitcoin
affects the transaction-confirmation time. We consider two scenarios in terms of
the increase in the arrival rate of transactions. In the first scenario, λL changes
under a fixed λH . This scenario illustrates the case in which the demand of
micro payment grows independently. In the second scenario, on the other hand,
we increase the overall transaction-arrival rate λ = λH + λL, keeping the ratio
of λH to λL constant. This case corresponds to the growth of Bitcoin-user
population.
6.4.1. Impact of increase in L-class transactions
Figure 6 represents how the mean transaction-confirmation time is affected
by the arrival rate of L-class transactions. In this figure, λH is fixed at 0.90466,
as shown in Table 5, and we plot five cases of b.
In Figure 6, E[TL] for each b grows exponentially with the increase in λL,
while E[TH ]’s are almost the same and remain constant. This result shows
that the priority mechanism provides a low transaction-confirmation time for
H-class transactions, while L-class transactions are likely to suffer from a large
transaction-confirmation time when the arrival rate of L-class transactions is
high. Remind that the mean arrival rate of L-class transactions is 0.068082,
and that the current maximum block size can be roughly approximated by
b = 2000. Figure 6 indicates that if the arrival rate of L-class transactions
becomes 30 times larger than 0.068082 (λL ≈ 2) and the maximum block size
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Figure 7: Mean transaction-confirmation time: high priority case. The ratio of λH to λL is
fixed, and the overall arrival rate λ changes.
is limited to 1 Mbyte, the resulting confirmation time of L-class transactions is
extremely large.
6.4.2. Growth of Bitcoin-user population
Figures 7 and 8 show how λ affects E[TH ] and E[TL], respectively. In both
figures, the horizontal axis represents λ, and we plot E[TH ]’s and E[TL]’s given
by (2) and (3) for the five cases of b. In these figures, both E[TL] and E[TH ]
grow exponentially with the increase in λ. We also observe that for b = 2000,
E[TH ] grows rapidly as λ approaches 3. This indicates that under the current
block-size limit of 1 Mbyte, even high-class transactions suffer from a huge
confirmation time when the usage demand of Bitcoin grows three times larger
than the current situation.
Figures 7 and 8 also show that increasing the maximum block size is effective
to mitigate the rapid growth of the transaction-confirmation time. When b =
5000, the growth of E[TH ] in Figure 7 is slow, however, E[TH ] rapidly increases
around λ = 9. This result indicates that increasing the maximum block size is
not a fundamental solution for the scalability of Bitcoin.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we analyzed the transaction-confirmation time for Bitcoin by
queueing theory. We modeled the transaction-confirmation process as a single-
server queue with batch service and priority mechanism. Assuming that the
priority of a transaction depends only on its input, we derived the mean confir-
mation time for transactions of each priority class. Numerical examples showed
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Figure 8: Mean transaction-confirmation time: low priority case. The ratio of λH to λL is
fixed, and the overall arrival rate λ changes.
that for the maximum block size of 1 Mbyte, transactions with small fees suffer
from an extremely large confirmation time if the arrival rate of transactions
whose fee is smaller than 0.0001 BTC becomes four times larger than the cur-
rent arrival rate. We also found that enhancing the maximum block size is not
an effective way to mitigate the transaction-confirmation time. Further study
is needed for the scalability of Bitcoin.
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Appendix A. Proofs of Theorems in Priority Queueing Analysis
Appendix A.1. Proof of Theorem 1
When λE[S] < b holds, the system is stable and hence limiting probabilities
exist. Letting Pn(x) = limt→∞ Pn(x, t) and P0 = limt→∞ P0(t), we obtain from
17
the assumptions
λP0 =
b∑
k=1
∫ ∞
0
Pk(x)ξ(x)dx, (A.1)
d
dx
Pn(x) = −{λ+ ξ(x)}Pn(x) + λPn−1(x), n = 2, 3, . . . , (A.2)
d
dx
P1(x) = −{λ+ ξ(x)}P1(x). (A.3)
Intuitively, (A.1) is a balance equation in which the exiting rate from state 0 is
equal to the entering rate into the same state. The first term in the right-hand
side (r.h.s.) of (A.2) is derived from the event that the number of transactions
does not change during a small time interval, while the second term is yielded
from the event that a transaction arrives at the system with n transactions. We
derive (A.3) in a similar manner.
We also have the following boundary conditions
Pn(0) =
∫ ∞
0
Pn+b(x)ξ(x)dx, n = 2, 3, . . . , (A.4)
P1(0) =
∫ ∞
0
P1+b(x)ξ(x)dx+ λP0. (A.5)
Note that the left-hand side of (A.4) is the probability that there exist n trans-
actions in system at the beginning of the service time. This event occurs just
after the service completion in the state with n+ b transactions. (Remind that
b transactions are served simultaneously when the number of transactions in
system is greater than or equal to b.) The equation of (A.5) can be derived
in a similar manner, noting that the service with one transaction starts when
a transaction arrival occurs at system in idle (the second term in the r.h.s. of
(A.5)).
The normalizing condition is given by
P0 +
∞∑
n=1
∫ ∞
0
Pn(x)dx = 1. (A.6)
We define the following probability generating functions (pgf’s)
P (z;x) =
∞∑
n=1
Pn(x)z
n,
P (z) = P0 +
∫ ∞
0
P (z;x)dx.
Multiplying (A.2) by zn and (A.3) by z, and summing over n = 1, 2, . . ., we
obtain
P (z;x) = P (z; 0){1−G(x)} exp{−λ(1− z)x}. (A.7)
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From the boundary conditions (A.4) and (A.5), we also have
P (z; 0) =
∑b
k=1(z
b+1 − zk)
zb −G∗(λ− λz) ·
∫ ∞
0
Pk(x)ξ(x)dx, (A.8)
where G∗(s) is the LST of G(x) and given by
G∗(s) =
∫ ∞
0
e−sxdG(x).
For notational simplicity, we define αk (k = 1, 2, . . . , b) as
αk =
∫ ∞
0
Pk(x)ξ(x)dx.
From Rouche’s theorem (see, for example, [18]), it is shown that the equation
zb −G∗(λ− λz) = 0, (A.9)
has b roots inside |z| = 1 +  for a small real number  > 0. One of them is
z = 1. Let z∗m (m = 1, 2, . . . , b− 1) denote the m-th root of (A.9) different from
1. Hence, from (A.8), we have the following b− 1 equations
b∑
k=1
{(z∗m)b+1 − (z∗m)k} · αk = 0, m = 1, 2, . . . , b− 1. (A.10)
From (A.7), we obtain∫ ∞
0
P (z;x)dx =
∫ ∞
0
P (z; 0){1−G(x)} exp{−λ(1− z)x}dx
= P (z; 0)
1−G∗(λ− λz)
λ− λz . (A.11)
From (A.11), P (z) is yielded as
P (z) = P0 + P (z; 0)
1−G∗(λ− λz)
λ− λz . (A.12)
Substituting z = 1 into (A.8) yields
P (1; 0) =
∑b
k=1(b+ 1− k)αk
b− λE[S] . (A.13)
Note that (A.13) holds if the following stability condition holds.
λE[S] < b. (A.14)
Noting that P (1) = 1, we obtain from (A.1), (A.12) and (A.13)
b∑
k=1
{
(b+ 1− k)E[S]
b− λE[S] +
1
λ
}
· αk = 1. (A.15)
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From (A.10) and (A.15), αk’s are uniquely determined.
Using αk’s, (A.1) and (A.8) can be rewritten as
P0 =
1
λ
b∑
k=1
αk, P (z; 0) =
∑b
k=1(z
b+1 − zk)αk
zb −G∗(λ− λz) .
Substituting the above expressions into (A.12) yields
P (z) =
1
λ
b∑
k=1
αk +
∑b
k=1(z
b+1 − zk)αk
zb −G∗(λ− λz) ·
1−G∗(λ− λz)
λ− λz . (A.16)
The mean number of transactions in the system E[N ] is given by
E[N ] =
(
d
dz
P (z)
)
z=1
=
1
2λ(b− λE[S])
(
b∑
k=1
αk
[
b(b− 1) + {(b+ 1)b− k(k − 1)}λE[S]
+(b− k)λ2E[S2]
]
− λ{b(b− 1)− λ2E[S2]}) .
Let T denote the sojourn time of a transaction. Note that in Bitcoin case, T
is the transaction-confirmation time. From Little’s theorem, the mean sojourn
time of a transaction E[T ] is yielded as
E[T ] =
E[N ]
λ
=
1
2λ2(b− λE[S])
(
b∑
k=1
αk
[
b(b− 1) + {(b+ 1)b− k(k − 1)}λE[S]
+(b− k)λ2E[S2]
]
− λ{b(b− 1)− λ2E[S2]}) .
Since E[T ] is a function of λ, we define f(λ) ≡ E[T ] for the following subsection.
Appendix A.2. Proof of Priority Queueing Analysis
Consider a sample path in which a low-priority transaction arrives at the
system in idle and starts a busy period. Consider also the other sample path
in which a high-priority transaction arrives at the system in idle and starts a
busy period. In our model, note that the elapsed service time of high-priority
transaction in the former sample path is smaller than that in the latter one.
This implies that our priority queueing model is not work conserving.
When the system utilization
∑c
i=1 λiE[S] is large, however, the busy period
becomes large and the idle state rarely occurs. In such high-utilization envi-
ronment, the event that an low-priority transaction starts a busy period rarely
occurs.
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Assuming that the system is work conserving [20], we have
f(λc) =
c∑
k=1
λk
λc
E[Tk], (A.17)
where E[Tk] is the sojourn time of class k transactions. Since class 1 transactions
are served similarly to the batch service analyzed in the previous subsection,
E[T1] is given by
E[T1] = f(λ1). (A.18)
Note that for i < j, any class-j transactions don’t affect the service of class-i
transactions. In other words, Ti is independent of transactions whose priority
class is lower than i, and hence (A.17) holds not only c but also i = 2, 3, . . . , c−1.
This yields
f(λi) =
i∑
k=1
λk
λi
E[Tk]
=
i−1∑
k=1
λk
λi
E[Tk] +
λi
λi
E[Ti].
We then obtain
E[Ti] =
1
λi
(
λif(λi)−
i−1∑
k=1
λkE[Tk]
)
, i = 2, 3, . . . , c. (A.19)
Note that E[Ti]’s can be calculated recursively by (A.18) and (A.19).
Appendix B. Block-Generation Time Distribution
In this section, we prove that the block-generation time follows an exponen-
tial distribution.
Remind that each miner node tries to solve the mathematical problem based
on a cryptographic hash algorithm. This problem consists of calculating a hash
of the block being formed and adjusting a nonce word such that the resulting
hash value is smaller than or equal to a targeted value called difficulty [19].
The number of nonce words the miner tries is tremendously huge, making the
mathematical problem too difficult. Here, we assume that the number of nonce
words is finite and equal to M .
When a miner tries one nonce word and finds it incorrect, the miner immedi-
ately tries the other word and never tries the same nonce again. We can model
the mining process as the following urn model without replacement. That is, we
have an urn containing M balls, of which M − 1 are white and one is red. The
red ball is a winner. One ball is withdrawn from the urn at a time, and then it
is removed from the urn without replacement. In this setting, the probability
that the red ball is drawn at kth trial is 1/M , a discrete-uniform distribution. If
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one trial is performed at a unit time, the probability that the red ball is drawn
at time k is also given by 1/M .
Suppose that there exist n miner nodes. Without loss of generality, we
assume that the number of winning nonce words is one and that the number of
nonce words is M . Let Yi (i = 1, 2, . . . , n) denote the time at which miner i finds
a winning nonce word. We assume Yi’s are i.i.d. We define the block-generation
time as Ln. Then we have
Ln = min{Y1, Y2, . . . , Yn}.
For simplicity, we assume Yi follows a continuous-uniform distribution U(0,M),
that is,
Pr{Yi ≤ x} =
{
x/M, 0 ≤ x ≤M,
0, others.
Then, the distribution of Ln is yielded as
Pr{Ln ≤ x} = Pr{min(X1, . . . , Xn) ≤ x}
= 1− Pr{min(X1, . . . , Xn) > x}
= 1−
(
1− x
M
)n
.
Now consider a limit distribution of (Ln− bn)/an for sequences of constants
{an > 0} and bn. In extreme value theory, it is known that the distribution of
(Ln− bn)/an for the minimum of Xi’s converges to a Weibull distribution when
Xi follows uniform distribution ([11] p. 59, Table A.1).
For 0 ≤ z ≤ n, setting an = 1/n and bn = 0 yields
Pr
{
Ln − bn
an
≤ z
}
= 1−
{
1− (z/M)
n
}n
→ 1− e−z/M , n→∞.
From this result, for a large n, we can approximate the distribution of Ln by
Pr{Ln ≤ x} ≈ 1− exp{−(n/M)x}.
This result implies that Ln follows an exponential distribution when n is large.
Figure 3 in subsection 6.1 shows a good agreement between exponential
distribution and measured data. According to [21], the number of miner nodes is
about 5,700, and hence this number is large enough so that the block-generation
time is well approximated by exponential distribution.
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